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State Neutrality and Freedom of
Conscience and Religion
Bruce Ryder*
While religion has always been a significant force in Canadian public life, the relationship between religious and state authority has
changed profoundly. An explicit or implicit alliance between state
norms and the teachings of the dominant Christian religions, long taken
for granted, has been steadily challenged, especially in the last half
century. The state is now conceived, in popular and constitutional discourses, as officially secular yet supportive of religious pluralism and
multiculturalism. The path from a de facto Christian state to a secular
pluralist state is not easily travelled — witness the tortured public debates about replacing the legal definition of marriage derived from
Christendom with one that better reflects the contemporary objectives of
state regulation of family relationships. We are still in the early stages of
trying to work out what it means for the Canadian state to be both officially secular and supportive of religious pluralism. In this period of
uneasy transition, the respective roles of secular and religious norms in
shaping public policy are matters of considerable political debate and
scholarly attention.1
The Supreme Court has had a few opportunities to contribute to these
debates in recent years.2 However, its engagement with the Canadian

*

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
See, e.g., John McLaren and Harold Coward, eds., Religious Conscience, the State, and
the Law: Historical Contexts and Contemporary Significance (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1999); Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in
Pluralism, Religion and Public Policy (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2004); Marguerite Van Die, ed., Religion and Public Life in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2001); David Lyon & Marguerite Van Die, eds., Rethinking Church, State and
Modernity: Canada Between Europe and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2000); Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion
(December 2004).
2
Most notably in Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87,
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 (school board’s refusal to approve the use of books depicting same-sex parents
violated legislative requirements of secularism and non-discrimination) and Trinity Western University
v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (teachers’ college
1
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) guarantee of freedom of
conscience and religion has been limited. In 2004, religious freedom
issues came to the fore on the Court’s docket, as they have in public
debates generally. The Court issued three significant rulings on religious
freedom:3 in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,4 it grappled with the very
nature of religion and religious belief and issued a ruling requiring accommodation of practices grounded in an individual’s subjectively held
sincere religious beliefs; in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference,5 it concluded that the federal government’s proposed legislative redefinition of
civil marriage to include same-sex couples posed no threat to freedom
of religion; and in Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-JérômeLafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village),6 it considered whether a municipality
was under an obligation to amend its zoning by-laws to facilitate the
purchase of land suitable for a place of worship by a congregation of
Jehovah’s Witnesses.

I. STATE NEUTRALITY
Before turning to a discussion of the Court’s three 2004 rulings on
religious freedom, we will begin by exploring the theme of religious
neutrality introduced by LeBel J. in Lafontaine. Justice LeBel described
freedom of religion as imposing “a duty of state neutrality.” The role of
the state, he wrote, is to act “as an essentially neutral intermediary in
relations between the various denominations and between those denominations and civil society.”7
Using conceptions of state neutrality to characterize the obligations
imposed on governments by constitutional guarantees of freedom of
religion is commonplace in the United States, although less so in Canada. Neutrality has played a central role in the rich and complex case law

erred in concluding that a private Christian university’s requirement that students ascribe to religious beliefs condemning homosexuality was inherently discriminatory).
3
Another decision is pending on an appeal from a Quebec ruling holding that freedom of
religion does not entitle a Sikh student to wear a kirpan in his public school: Multani (tuteur de) c.
Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2004] J.Q. no. 1904 (Que. C.A.), appeal heard and
reserved by the Supreme Court of Canada [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 198.
4
[2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551.
5
[2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
6
[2004] S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650.
7
Id., at para. 67.

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

State Neutrality and Religious Freedom

171

interpreting the First Amendment’s protection of the free exercise of
religion and its prohibition on the establishment of religion. In American jurisprudence, judges tend to agree on the existence of a state duty
of religious neutrality, but often disagree about what it means in theory
and practice. Neutrality, as Harlan J. famously remarked, “is a coat of
many colors.”8
While exploring the concept of state neutrality helps capture the essence of legal understandings of religious freedom, it is also an elusive
concept. Neutrality has no fixed meaning.9 Its content is heavily influenced by historical factors and changing cultural contexts. We should
not expect neutrality to have the same meanings across time or across
jurisdictions. Because of the breadth and depth of First Amendment
jurisprudence, American understandings of neutrality loom large in the
literature. Yet Canadian political traditions, our constitutional text, and
our jurisprudence differ from the American experience regarding church
and state. As a result, our understandings of the state’s duty of religious
neutrality are also different.
Two different kinds of neutrality dominate discussions in the area of
religious freedom. One is neutrality between religions, a kind of neutrality required by both the Canadian and American constitutions, although
Canadian constitutional jurisprudence imposes more expansive positive
obligations on the state to ensure that its laws or policies do not unduly
burden the exercise of religious freedoms. The second kind of neutrality
is neutrality about religion, a kind of neutrality required by the American constitution but not by the Canadian. I will discuss each in turn.
1. Neutrality Between Religions
It is well established in Canadian jurisprudence that the state is subject to a duty of neutrality between religions. As Dickson C.J. wrote in
the Big M case, “[t]he protection of one religion and the concomitant
non-protection of others imports disparate impact destructive of the
religious freedom of the collectivity.”10 Freedom of religion prohibits
8

Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, at 249 (1968).
For a thorough critique of neutrality, see Frank Ravitch, “A Funny Thing Happened on
the Road to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism and the Establishment Clause” (2004) 38
Georgia L. Rev. 489.
10
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, at para. 98, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at
337. See also See José Woehrling, “L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable et l’adaptation de
9
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laws or policies that have the purpose or effect of favouring or burdening some religious beliefs or practices over others. The state may not
require a course of action for the purpose of compelling religious compliance or attempting religious indoctrination.11 Rather, respect for freedom of religion requires that governments avoid laws or policies that
seek to enforce the practices of a particular religion or indoctrinate citizens in particular religious beliefs. Thus, for example, the courts have
held that public institutions cannot engage in religious indoctrination by
compelling participation in prayers or religious instruction dominated by
the perspective of a single denomination.12 Furthermore, governments
have a constitutional obligation to adjust laws or policies to remove any
state-imposed burdens on religious freedom that cannot be reasonably
and demonstrably justified pursuant to section 1 of the Charter.13
The concept of state neutrality between religions does not exhaustively account for the meanings of freedom of religion. Any law or government policy that imposes a non-trivial burden on the exercise of
religious or conscientious freedoms will violate section 2(a) of the Charter, whether or not the impact is on the adherents of one belief system or
many. In other words, section 2(a) can be violated by a law that is neutral in the sense that is equally oppressive of all religions. Nevertheless,
the state duty of neutrality between religions has been the concern of
many of the leading cases on section 2(a): Big M,14 Zylberberg15 and
Canadian Civil Liberties Association16 all involved laws that had the
la société à la diversité religieuse” (1998) 43 McGill L.J. 325, at para 96: “… la liberté de religion
impose une obligation de neutralité à l’État en matière religieuse qui l’empêche de privilégier ou de
défavoriser une religion par rapport aux autres.” As Woehrling explains, the obligation of neutrality
is supported by s. 2(a), s. 15 and s. 27 of the Charter: “… l’obligation de neutralité de l’État en
matière religieuse découle également, outre les articles 2(a) et 15 de la Charte, de l’article 27 sur le
multiculturalisme. En effet, dans la mesure où la religion fait partie de la culture, le respect du
multiculturalisme est incompatible avec le fait de favoriser certaines religions par rapport à
d’autres.” Id., at note 178.
11
Big M, id.
12
Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town), [1999] O.J. No. 3524, 179 D.L.R. (4th) 150 (C.A.);
Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Ontario (Minister of Education), [1990] O.J. No. 104, 65 D.L.R.
(4th) 1 (C.A.); Russow v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), [1989] B.C.J. No. 611, 62 D.L.R.
(4th) 98 (B.C.); Manitoba Assn. for Rights and Liberties Inc. v. Manitoba, [1992] M.J. No. 391, 94
D.L.R. (4th) 678 (Q.B.); Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (Director), [1988] O.J. No.
1488, 52 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (C.A.).
13
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
14
Supra, note 10.
15
Supra, note 12.
16
Supra, note 12.
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purpose or effect of compelling observance of Christian teachings or
practices, and thus violated state neutrality by preferring one religious
tradition over others.
The duty of neutrality between religions is firmly established in
American jurisprudence as well. However, in Smith (1990),17 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that generally applicable laws that are neutral on
their face do not violate the First Amendment solely because they have
the incidental effect of burdening religious belief or practice. The Smith
ruling departed from earlier decisions holding that the First Amendment
required governments to provide exemptions to laws burdening religious
beliefs or practices, unless such exemptions would compromise compelling state objectives.18 The Canadian courts have held that section 2(a)
of the Charter can be violated by the indirect effects of facially neutral
laws. Governments have an obligation to adjust their laws and policies
to eliminate any unnecessary interference with religious freedom. When
special measures are put in place by government to accommodate religious freedoms — for example, providing employees with time for
religious prayer and observance — the state is giving effect to neutrality
because without such accommodations facially neutral rules would
manifestly not be neutral in their impact. The Canadian conception of
neutrality between religions is thus more expansive and robust compared to its American constitutional counterpart.
Several common misconceptions about the state’s duty of neutrality
between religions need to be addressed. Religious neutrality does not
mean that the state must refuse to take positions on policy disputes that
have a religious dimension. Many if not most legislative policies will
accord with some religious beliefs and violate others. Critics who say
that the state cannot act in a religiously neutral manner in this sense
have a compelling point.19 Secularism, for example, is not neutral. There
17
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
18
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Frazee v. Illinois, 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Legislation enacted by Congress in response to Smith has
restored the legal principles set out in this line of cases. See the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
42 U.S.C. s. 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
19
See Richard Moon, “Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Religious Freedom under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 41 Brandeis L.J. 563; David M. Brown, “Freedom From or Freedom For? Religion as a Case Study in Defining the Content of Charter Rights”
(2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 551; Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society:
Essays in Pluralism, Religion and Public Policy (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); Rex
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is no such thing as a view from nowhere. Secular constitutional documents like the Charter are political expressions of a particular philosophy about religion and life.20 But even if we acknowledge that it is not
coherent to speak of any position as being philosophically or religiously
neutral, the state remains subject to a duty to avoid laws or policies that
have the purpose or effect of interfering with the exercise of religious
freedoms.
Furthermore, the state’s duty of religious neutrality does not require
that arguments grounded in religious beliefs must be ignored when
formulating policy. Religious perspectives have played and should continue to play an important role in public debates. Ultimately, though, the
validity of state laws and policies must be determined by reference to
constitutional norms rather than religious doctrine.21
2. Neutrality About Religion
Must the state remain neutral about religion generally, that is, neutral as between adherents of religious and conscientious belief systems
and non-adherents? Or can the state pursue policies that aid religion
generally, so long as it does so in an even-handed manner that respects
the duty of neutrality between religions? While there is less case law
and commentary on this point, Canadian jurisprudence does not impose
on the state a duty of neutrality about religion. Rather, the Canadian
position appears to be that the state can aid religion so long as it does so

Ahdar & Ian Leigh, “Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?” (2004) 49 McGill L.J.
635, at para. 102; R. Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality (University of Notre Dame Press,
1991); Iain T. Benson, “Notes Towards a (Re)definition of the ‘Secular’” (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev.
519; David N. Cinotti, “The Incoherence of Neutrality: A Case for Eliminating Neutrality from
Religion Clause Jurisprudence” (2003) 45 J. Church & St. 499.
20
Tariq Modood, “Introduction: Establishment, Reform and Multiculturalism” in Tariq
Modood, ed., Church, State and Religious Minorities (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1997), 3 at
13.
21
See Chamberlain, supra, note 2, per McLachlin C.J.C. at para. 59, commenting on
whether a school board’s curricular decisions can be influenced by religious views:
The requirement of secularism … does not preclude decisions motivated in whole or in part
by religious considerations, provided they are otherwise within the Board’s powers. It simply signals the need for educational decisions and policies, whatever their motivation, to respect the multiplicity of religious and moral views that are held by families in the school
community. It follows that the fact that some parents and Board members may have been
motivated by religious views is of no moment. What matters is whether the Board’s decision was unreasonable in the context of the educational scheme mandated by the legislature.
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in a manner that respects the principle of neutrality or even-handedness
between religions.
The relationship between religion and state has never been a simple
one in Canada. The metaphor of an impregnable wall between church
and state,22 so often invoked in the United States, is not a plausible description of Canadian constitutional traditions. In the introduction to his
collection of historical documents on the topic, John Moir commented:
“Canada has rejected the European tradition of church establishment
without adopting the American ideal of complete separation. Here no
established church exists, yet neither is there an unscalable wall between
religion and politics.”23 Writing in 1967, he noted that “Canadians in
fact assume the presence of an unwritten separation of church and state,
without denying an essential connection between religious principles
and national life or the right of the churches to speak out on matters of
public importance.”24 He characterized this difficult to define relationship as “peculiarly Canadian” and called it “legally disestablished religiosity”: “The tradition of church and state in Canada has grown into a
peculiar paradox — anti-establishmentarian, but not secularist. Our
history and our constitution require that the state be neither indifferent
to nor involved in the church, and vice-versa.”25
Moir’s account needs to be updated, since Canadians’ attitudes to
church and state have evolved a great deal since 1967. The state is more
resolutely secularist now, and the place of explicit reliance on religion in
public debates is much more contested. The paradox Moir described has
been reshaped in the Charter era, in part by the increasing multiculturalism and religious pluralism that characterizes Canadian society, and in
part by the impact of the Charter itself. The Charter is, in many important ways, the nation’s new secular religion, establishing the fundamental norms with which all laws and public policies must comply.
The Charter may appear to embody a paradox similar to the one
Moir described. Moir spoke of a “legally disestablished religiosity”
characterizing Canadian political culture, one that has evolved, in

22

E.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
John S. Moir, Church and State in Canada, 1627-1867 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), at xiii.
24
Id.
25
Id., at xix.
23
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George Egerton’s expression, into a “religiously-positive pluralism.”26
The preamble of the Charter announces that Canada is a nation
“founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the
rule of law.” Sections 2(a) and 15 guarantee religious freedom and
religious equality, respectively. Section 27 directs that the Charter be
interpreted so as to preserve and enhance Canada’s multicultural heritage, and section 29 protects existing denominational school rights.
How are we to make sense of this jumble of apparently paradoxical
provisions?27 Is it possible to simultaneously affirm both sacred and
secular sources of authority? To integrate the nation’s historical roots
and its future aspirations?
Given the surprisingly strong interpretive weight the Supreme Court
has given to the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867,28 and to the
reference to the rule of law in the Charter’s preamble,29 it may be only a
matter of time before the courts cease to view the preamble as “an embarrassment to be ignored,”30 and embrace it as an interpretive opportunity thus far missed.31 The supremacy of God clause is perhaps best
understood as a reminder of the state’s role in not just respecting the
autonomy of faith communities, but also in nurturing and supporting
them, as long as it does so in an even-handed manner.32

26
George Egerton, “Writing the Canadian Bill of Rights: Religion, Politics and the Challenge of Pluralism 1957-1960” (2004) 19 C.J.L.S. 1, at 19.
27
William Klassen sees the preamble and the Charter’s guarantee of religious freedom as
“a contradiction which even a theologian, to say nothing of all the lawyers, must surely recognize”:
“Religion and the Nation: An Ambiguous Alliance” (1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 87 at 95.
28
See Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 per Lamer C.J.C., describing the preamble to the
1867 Act as the “grand entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution” (at para. 109).
29
See Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights (Man), [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 721; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
30
Brown, supra, note 19, at para. 20.
31
In this regard, see Lorne Sossin’s ambitious attempt to vitalize the preamble as “a repository of the tenets of our moral system and commitments to social justice”: “The ‘Supremacy of
God’, Human Dignity and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 227, at 237.
See also George Egerton, “Trudeau, God, and the Canadian Constitution: Religion, Human Rights
and Government Authority in the Making of the 1982 Constitution,” in Lyon & Van Die, eds.,
supra, note 1.
32
For example, regarding the public funding of private religious schools, José Woehrling
writes that “le principe de neutralité religieuse découlant de la liberté de conscience et de religion
n’interdirait pas à l’État de les aider financièrement, à condition qu’il le fasse sans privilégier ni
défavoriser aucune religion par rapport aux autres.” Supra, note 10, at para. 104.
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The preamble represents a kind of secular humility, a recognition
that there are other truths, other sources of competing world-views, of
normative and authoritative communities that are profound sources of
meaning in people’s lives that ought to be nurtured as counter-balances
to state authority.
The preamble’s references to the “supremacy of God” and the “rule
of law” express a form of reconciliation between the secular nature of
the state and the importance of protecting religious belief and practice.
They underline the fact that the state is secular and must be neutral between religions, but that it should also nurture and protect religious
expression. In this way, there is a complementarity, not a conflict, in the
preamble’s reference to the “supremacy of God,” the Charter’s guarantees of religious freedom and equality, and the promotion of multiculturalism. The text of the Charter as a whole suggests that the Canadian
state should aim to secure a religiously positive pluralism in an evenhanded manner.33 This is best accomplished by a secular state that is
neutral between religions but not neutral about religion.34
In contrast, in the United States a much stricter wall separates secular and religious authorities. The Canadian Constitution lacks an equivalent of the First Amendment’s anti-establishment clause. The American
Constitution has no equivalent of the Canadian Charter’s “supremacy of
God” preamble. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court is committed to
33

For example, if public schools choose to be involved in religious education, or if public
institutions observe religious practices, they must do so in an even-handed manner that avoids
indoctrination and respects a plurality of religious and conscientious beliefs. See Zylberberg, supra,
note 12.
34
The content of the Canadian state’s obligations of religious neutrality presented here
shares much common ground, if not the eloquence, of Justice Albie Sachs description of the South
African position:
South Africa is an open and democratic society with a non-sectarian state that guarantees
freedom of worship; is respectful of and accommodatory towards, rather than hostile to or
walled-off from, religion; acknowledges the multi-faith and multi-belief nature of the country; does not favour one religious creed or doctrinal truth above another; accepts the intensely personal nature of individual conscience and affirms the intrinsically voluntary and noncoerced character of belief; respects the rights of non-believers; and does not impose orthodoxies of thought or require conformity of conduct in terms of any particular world-view.
The Constitution, then, is very much about the acknowledgement by the state of different
belief systems and their accommodation within a non-hierarchical framework of equality
and non-discrimination. It follows that the state does not take sides on questions of religion.
It does not impose belief, grant privileges to or impose disadvantages on adherents of any
particular belief, require conformity in matters simply of belief, involve itself in purely religious controversies, or marginalise people who have different beliefs.
S. v. Lawrence, 1997 (4) SA 1176, at para. 148.
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the view that the First Amendment mandates both kinds of governmental neutrality — “between religion and religion, and between religion
and non-religion.”35 Canadian law is even more strongly committed to
the first kind of state neutrality, neutrality between religions. But on the
second type of neutrality, ours is a different tradition, one that supports
and encourages even-handed state support of religious and conscientious
freedoms.
The difference between Canadian and American approaches to the
issue of state neutrality about religion is perhaps most evident in controversies regarding public funding of religious schools. In the United
States, government programs providing direct financial aid to religious
schools — even if made available in an even-handed manner to all denominations — are prohibited as a violation of the principle of neutrality flowing from the establishment clause of the First Amendment.36 In
Canada, on the other hand, the issue has not been whether governments
are permitted to provide direct financial aid to religious schools; the
question has been whether the Charter requires further government
funding of religious schools beyond those already enjoying constitutionally entrenched denominational school rights. In the Adler case, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter creates no
constitutional obligation to fund religious schools. None of the judgments in the case suggested there was any constitutional impediment to
the extension of state funding to religious schools. To the contrary, in
the principal majority opinion, Iacobucci J. wrote that the provinces are
free to extend funding to religious schools if they so choose.37 Similarly,
in her dissenting opinion, L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote that public funding
would “promote the value of religious tolerance in this context where

35

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, at 104 (1968). See also Everson, supra, note 22, per
Black J. (“Neither a state nor the Federal Government … can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”); McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 2005 U.S. Lexis 5211, per Souter J. for the majority.
36
E.g., Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (tuition tax credits for parents of children in private religious schools declared unconstitutional). The Court has upheld forms of aid that are made available neutrally to parents of children at
any school, religious or not: Mueller v. Allen, 421 U.S. 349 (1983); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639 (2002). For excellent discussions of the complexity of the American jurisprudence on
religious neutrality, see Douglas Laycock, “The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality”
(1997) 46 Emory L.J. 43; Douglas Laycock, “Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion” (1990) 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993.
37
Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, at para. 48.
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some religious communities cannot be accommodated in the secular
system.”38
(a) Religious Neutrality and Positive State Obligations: Lafontaine
The discussion of religious neutrality above led to the conclusion
that Canadian governments must remain neutral between religions but
need not be neutral about religion. They may extend support to religion
so long as they do so in an even-handed manner. What about positive
obligations? To what extent must the state take positive steps to facilitate the exercise of religious freedom? In Big M39 and Edwards Books40
the Court understood freedom of religion, like the other fundamental
freedoms, as imposing primarily negative obligations on the state to
avoid adopting policies that would impose coercive pressure on individuals. However, the Court recognized that a purely negative conception
of freedom of religion would be incomplete. Section 2(a) imposes a mix
of positive and negative obligations on the state. The state has positive
obligations to adjust laws or policies that have the effect of imposing
burdens on religious belief and practice. Ostensibly neutral rules are not
necessarily neutral in their impact on religion. Thus, to cite a few wellknown examples, if they can do so without undue hardship, employers
must adjust workplace rules to permit employees to engage in religious
observance41 and governments must design and implement sabbatarian
exemptions to Sunday closing laws to alleviate the financial burden
placed on retailers who observe a Sabbath other than Sunday.42
In the absence of state-imposed burdens on religious freedom, the
courts have not interpreted section 2(a) as imposing positive obligations
on governments to facilitate the exercise of religious freedoms. “Never,”
wrote McLachlin J. (as she then was) in the Adler case, “has it been
suggested that freedom of religion entitles one to state support for one’s
religion.”43 Thus, for example, the existing jurisprudence would likely

38

Id., at para. 106.
Supra, note 10.
40
Supra, note 13.
41
E.g., Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] S.C.J. No. 74,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536.
42
E.g., Edwards Books, supra, note 13.
43
Adler, supra, note 37, at para. 200.
39
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require governments to adjust their employment policies to accommodate, up to the point of undue hardship, the religious needs of public
sector employees by making time and space available for prayer or
meditation; it does not require governments to pass laws requiring private sector employers to do the same.
While the Charter does not impose obligations on governments to
support religion, it permits and arguably encourages such support. Provincial governments may make public funding available to private religious schools, so long as they do so in an even-handed manner.44 The
Ontario Court of Appeal has held that pluralist religious instruction is
permissible in public schools so long as it falls short of religious indoctrination.45 The state must avoid imposing burdens on religious freedoms, and it may choose to be supportive and facilitative of all religious
observance, so long as it can do so, as a practical matter, in an evenhanded manner.
The nature of governments’ positive obligations, and their relationship to duties of religious neutrality, were raised before the Supreme
Court of Canada in Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-JérômeLafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village).46 A congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses felt they were unable to locate a suitable piece of land on which
to build a place of worship, a Kingdom Hall, within the area zoned for
this purpose by the village of Lafontaine’s by-laws. Whether suitable
land was truly unavailable was a crucial and disputed issue throughout
the litigation that ensued. The Congregation had been looking for land
on which to build a Kingdom Hall since 1989 and had been seeking
permission from the municipality to build such a facility since 1992.
Each time the Congregation located suitable parcels of land elsewhere,
the Congregation was unsuccessful in its attempts to persuade the village to amend its zoning by-laws. On the third occasion the municipality
refused to amend its by-laws, it stated, in a 1993 letter, that it need not
explain why:
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The municipal council of Lafontaine is not required to provide you
with a justification and we therefore have no intention of giving
47
reasons for the council’s decision.

As McLachlin C.J. later noted, this letter “effectively foreclosed any
possibility that the Municipality would assist the Congregation in its
quest for land upon which to build its place of worship.”48 The Congregation then initiated an action alleging that the municipality’s refusal to
amend its zoning by-law violated its freedom of religion.
At the Quebec Superior Court, the trial judge, Dubois J., found that
suitable land was still available for purchase within the area where the
zoning by-law permitted the construction of places of worship. He
found that the by-law did not infringe freedom of religion.
On appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal was unanimous in finding
that the trial judge had made an unreasonable error in his assessment of
the facts. The Court of Appeal was of the view that, practically speaking, no suitable land was available in the area zoned for places of worship. The Court of Appeal divided on the significance of this fact.
The majority, Gendreau and Pelletier JJ.A., held that the Municipality was not responsible for the unavailability of land and had no
positive obligation to facilitate freedom of religion. The source of the
problem was the unwillingness of private landowners to sell their property. The Municipality was under no duty to ensure that every religious
community could have a place of worship located within its boundaries.
Chief Justice Robert dissenting, held that the zoning by-law infringed freedom of religion as it made it impossible for the appellants to
build a place of worship. The Municipality was therefore under a duty to
make a reasonable effort to accommodate the appellants by amending its
zoning by-law to permit the construction of a place of worship in another area.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a 5-4 ruling, allowed the appeal.
The majority opinion, written by McLachlin C.J.,49 was based exclusively on administrative law grounds. Unlike the Quebec Court of Appeal,
the majority accepted the trial judge’s finding that land was available
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where a Kingdom Hall could be built.50 This finding undercut the factual basis of the religious freedom argument. The majority, in declining to
address whether the zoning by-law or actions of the Municipality violated religious freedom, likely believed that a useful discussion of the
constitutional obligations of municipalities in this area should await a
more favourable factual foundation. Nevertheless, given that the Congregation and a number of interveners had focused their arguments on
the religious freedom issues, the majority’s refusal to even consider
them is somewhat surprising.
Instead of engaging the constitutional issues, the majority held that
the Municipality violated its duty of procedural fairness owed to the
Congregation by refusing to provide reasons to justify its decisions to
deny two of the applications for rezoning. In considering the scope of
the duty of procedural fairness owed to the Congregation, McLachlin
C.J.C. noted that the Municipality needed to consider that its “decision
affects the Congregation’s practice of its religion. The right to freely
adhere to a faith and to congregate with others in doing so is of primary
importance.”51 In the result, the majority remitted the rezoning application to the Municipality for reconsideration.
The majority judges were apparently not troubled by the weakness
of the remedy they ordered. The Chief Justice acknowledged that the
result could be that the Municipality would simply refuse further applications for rezoning, accompanying its refusal this time with proper
reasons.52 If this was to occur, and the Congregation was unable to purchase land in the zone permitted for places of worship — a possible
result given the futility of their search prior to the litigation — would
religious freedom then be violated? The majority opinion is silent on
this question, compelling the Congregation to re-litigate the issue if this
sequence of events were to unfold. The majority thus chose a path that
offered the Congregation little support in its struggle with a municipality
that was apparently indifferent to its religious needs. The majority’s
failure to offer reasons for not addressing the religious freedom argument, apart from noting that it was “unnecessary” to do so,53 must have
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struck the Congregation as no more sympathetic to its plight than the
Municipality had been.
Justice LeBel’s dissent,54 even though it offered the Congregation
no immediate remedy, was more supportive of the Congregation’s religious freedom than the majority. In a lengthy obiter dicta, LeBel J.
indicated that the Municipality would be under a constitutional obligation to amend its zoning by-law if it turns out that no land is available to
the Congregation in the zone where places of worship are currently
permitted. Justice LeBel’s opinion is notable for his scholarly discussion
of the duty of religious neutrality and its impact on the question of when
governments can take, or must take, positive steps to support religious
freedom. His opinion provides useful future guidance to the village of
Lafontaine, and to other governments facing similar circumstances, on
the nature of their constitutional obligations to facilitate religious worship.
Justice LeBel would have denied any relief to the Congregation for
two reasons. First, even though he agreed with the majority’s finding
that the municipality had denied procedural fairness to the Congregation
by failing to provide sufficient reasons for its refusal to amend its zoning by-laws,55 he held that the Court could not base its decision on this
ground since the Congregation declined to rely on it at the hearing before the Court.56 Second, he accepted the trial judge’s finding that land
was available for purchase in the zone where places of worship could be
located and that, as a result, the Congregation’s freedom of religion had
not been violated by the by-laws or the Municipality’s failure to amend
them.57 The Congregation had failed to demonstrate that the purpose or
effect of the by-laws was to prevent it from building a place of worship
in the Municipality.58
Before reaching his conclusion on the religious freedom issue,
LeBel J. undertook a discussion of the duty of religious neutrality imposed on governments by section 2(a) of the Charter. Drawing on Pro-

54
Justices Bastarache and Deschamps concurring. Justice Major wrote a short separate
dissenting opinion, agreeing with the result reached by LeBel J. but restricting his reasons to the
absence of any violation of religious freedom based on the trial judge’s findings of fact.
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fessor Woehrling’s leading article on religious freedom,59 LeBel J.’s
discussion was in part a restatement of the well-established principle of
neutrality between religions. As he wrote,
… the state acts as an essentially neutral intermediary in relations
between the various denominations and between those denominations
and civil society … it is no longer the state’s place to give active
support to any one particular religion, if only to avoid interfering in
the religious practices of the religion’s members. The state must
60
respect a variety of faiths whose values are not easily reconciled.

The more innovative and controversial aspects of LeBel J.’s opinion
suggest that the duty of religious neutrality goes beyond a duty of evenhandedness as between religions. He argued that the state must also
remain neutral about the value of religion generally. He linked this idea
to the evolving “dissociation of the functions of church and state.”61 The
resulting “clear distinction between churches and public authorities,”62
in his view, requires the state to “be neutral in matters of religion.”63
Conceiving the Municipality’s duty of religious neutrality as embracing a duty of neutrality regarding the value of religious worship
itself, LeBel J. reached the following conclusion about the Municipality’s obligations:
As the municipality is required to be neutral in matters of religion, its
by-laws must be structured in such a way as to avoid placing
unnecessary obstacles in the way of the exercise of religious freedoms.
However, it does not have to provide assistance of any kind to
religious groups or actively help them resolve any difficulties they
might encounter in their negotiations with third parties in relation to
plans to establish a place of worship. In the case at bar, the
municipality did not have to provide the appellants with access to a lot
that corresponded better to their selection criteria. Such assistance
would be incompatible with the municipality’s duty of neutrality in
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that the municipality would be manipulating its regulatory standards in
favour of a particular religion. Such support for a religious group
could jeopardize the neutrality the municipality must adopt toward all
64
such groups.

Justice LeBel’s comments appear to be taking the conception of religious neutrality in a direction more consonant with American constitutional traditions. Canadian jurisprudence has not insisted on a “wall of
separation” between church and state, nor on a principle of state noninvolvement in matters religious. To the contrary, our jurisprudence
places a positive value on the protection and promotion of religious
pluralism. As discussed above, the preamble to the Charter, by affirming
that Canada “is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of
God” — when read in conjunction with the Charter’s commitments to
religious freedom, religious equality and multiculturalism — suggests
that the Charter should be interpreted in a manner that permits the state
to foster a religiously-positive pluralism. The state may nourish religious expression and foster the vitality of religious communities, so
long as it does so in an even-handed manner. Freedom of religion
should not be interpreted as imposing a duty on the state to refrain from
even-handed religious support.
From this perspective, while LeBel J. was right to insist that the
Municipality was under no obligation to assist the Congregation in finding better lots than the ones already available for sale, he was on less
solid ground in suggesting that the Municipality could not choose to
offer such assistance. So long as the Municipality could offer such assistance on an even-handed basis to any denomination seeking to construct
a place of worship, no duty of religious neutrality would be violated.
Justice LeBel went on to consider, in obiter dicta, whether freedom
of religion would be violated if the Congregation had demonstrated an
absence of suitable land available in the area zoned for places of worship. He found that a violation would have occurred. “The construction
of a place of worship,” he noted, “is an integral part of the freedom of
religion protected by s. 2(a) of the Charter.”65 Contrary to the conclusions of the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal, the unavailability
of a location where a place of worship could be constructed would not
64
65
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be the sole responsibility of private landowners. The Municipality
would bear responsibility as well for its refusal to adapt the zoning bylaw to evolving community needs. Thus, wrote LeBel J., the hypothetical situation where no property is available
… involves one such exceptional situation in which a posture of
restraint on the municipality’s part would interfere with the appellants’
freedom of religion. It would be utterly impossible for the appellants
to establish their place of worship within the boundaries of the
municipality if no land were available in the only zone where this type
of use is authorized. As it would then be impossible to practise their
religion, this would constitute direct interference with their freedom of
religion. This is a clear example of a case in which freedom of religion
can have no real meaning unless the public authorities take positive
action. Since such positive action would be required, it would
66
constitute a reasonable limit on the principle of state neutrality.

Justice LeBel’s conclusion that, in these circumstances, the Municipality would be under a positive constitutional obligation to amend its
zoning by-laws is compelling. However, his suggestion that the result
would be in conflict with (“a reasonable limit on”) the principle of state
neutrality is puzzling. In a passage quoted by LeBel J., Professor
Woehrling takes the same view:
… les deux principes constitutifs de la liberté de religion — libre
exercice et neutralité de l’État — doivent être considérés comme
mutuellement limitatifs, puisque le fait de donner une amplitude
maximale à l’un entraînerait fatalement la négation de l’autre.
L’obligation de neutralité de l’État en matière religieuse doit être
limitée par l’obligation d’accommodement, laquelle justifie certaines
67
formes d’assistance étatique aux religions.

The potential conflict posited by LeBel J. and Professor Woehrling
arises only if one conceives of religious neutrality as requiring a strict
separation between church and state. Yet, as discussed above, the Canadian constitutional position differs from the American in two crucial
respects. First, Canadian jurisprudence imposes an obligation on governments to adjust facially-neutral laws and policies to remove unnecessary
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burdens on religious freedom. Second, Canadian jurisprudence conceives of neutrality as permitting even-handed state promotion of religion. The state’s duty of neutrality between religions, in Canadian law,
does not require state neutrality about religion. It permits the state to
promote, in an even-handed manner, a religiously-positive pluralism.
In contrast to American constitutional law, then, no conflict arises in
Canadian constitutional law between state neutrality and positive duties
of accommodation. Rather, in order to remove burdens on religious
freedom resulting from state policies, and to give effect to the principle
of state neutrality between religions, positive state action is required. As
Dickson C.J. put it in Big M, “[t]he equality necessary to support religious freedom does not require identical treatment of all religions. In
fact the interests of true equality may well require differentiation in
treatment.”68
(b) Separating “Christendom” and State: The Same-Sex Marriage
Reference
If zoning laws seem an unlikely context in which issues related to
state duties of religious neutrality might arise, the same cannot be said
of marriage law, which for centuries has been the site of struggles over
the boundaries of religious and state authority. The Same-Sex Marriage
Reference69 raised the issue of whether freedom of religion hinders the
ability of Parliament to redefine civil marriage to include same-sex
couples.
References to the Supreme Court ought to be initiated by the federal
government where advice is needed to clarify uncertain legal issues. In
practice, however, references are often used for political purposes. The
Same-Sex Marriage Reference was a classic example of a politically
motivated use of the reference procedure. The government presented to
the Court a Proposed Act that would define civil marriage as the union
of two persons to the exclusion of all others, thus confirming the legality
of same-sex marriage across the country. At the time the reference was
initiated, court rulings in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec had left
little doubt that the federal government could pass such legislation and
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that, indeed, such a change in the law was required to give effect to the
equality rights of same-sex couples.70 The federal government’s decision to refer the Proposed Act to the Supreme Court appeared to be
motivated by a desire to buy further time to enable the public to get used
to the idea of same-sex marriage and to enlist the Supreme Court’s moral authority in supporting the legislation.
The public debate about same-sex marriage has been characterized
by confusion regarding the respective roles of church and state. This is
perhaps not surprising since the legal definition of marriage has long
been aligned with dominant religious understandings, and since most
marriages in Canada are performed in a religious context. No doubt the
federal government hoped that the Supreme Court’s opinion in the reference would help educate the public on the differences between religious and civil marriage and appease concerns that legalizing same-sex
marriage threatened religious freedom.
From the point of view of civic education on the respective roles of
church and state, the opinion issued by the Court in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference both succeeds and disappoints. The Court’s answers
were clear, yet terse. The Court seemed to adopt a minimalist approach:
say as little as possible and send the issues back to the politicians where
they belong. This was in sharp contrast to the Court’s approach in another recent reference, the Secession Reference,71 which also raised
questions on which there was little legal doubt yet a great deal of political confusion. In the Secession Reference, the Court crafted a lengthy
opinion that reads like a civics lesson, situating its answers in a careful
historical review of fundamental constitutional principles. The Court
clearly saw itself performing an important role in statecraft. Not so in
the Same-Sex Marriage Reference. The Court’s opinion is uncluttered
by historical embellishments, normative discursions or detailed analysis
of any kind.
Nevertheless, the Court did make clear that the Proposed Act was
within the constitutional competence of Parliament, and that it would be
consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In
70
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particular, the Court decisively rejected arguments that the Proposed Act
would violate freedom of religion.
The common law, according to the leading 1866 English ruling in
Hyde v. Hyde, defines marriage, “as understood in Christendom,” “as
the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.”72 After quoting this definition, the Court remarked
pointedly:
The reference to “Christendom” is telling. Hyde spoke to a society
of shared social values where marriage and religion were thought to be
inseparable. This is no longer the case. Canada is a pluralistic society.
73
Marriage, from the perspective of the state, is a civil institution.

If the common law definition flows from a Christian conception of marriage, the definition of marriage in the Proposed Act, the Court pointed
out, has a different kind of source. “Far from violating the Charter,” the
Court wrote, the Proposed Act “flows from it.”74 The historical shift
from religious to secular constitutional norms as a source of political
authority could not be more poignantly demonstrated.
State obligations of religious neutrality, while not explicitly discussed by the Court, cast doubt on the constitutional validity of the
common law definition of marriage, rather than on the definition in the
Proposed Act. Religious neutrality does not mean that the state must
avoid taking sides on matters of religious disagreement. Neutrality in
this sense is not possible unless the state refrains from regulating marriage, divorce and a host of other matters. Rather, religious neutrality, as
understood in Charter jurisprudence, requires the state to not take a
position for the purpose of favouring one religious view over another
and to avoid adopting laws or policies that have the effect of burdening
religious freedom. Since the common law definition was explicitly fashioned to implement Christian views, it is the common law definition that
is problematic from the point of view of state duties of religious neutrality. Since the definition in the Proposed Act was designed to achieve
Charter compliance, it is not problematic from the point of view of state
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neutrality unless it would have the effect of interfering with religious
freedom.
The Court went on to summarily dispense with the arguments that
the Proposed Act would have the effect of violating religious freedom.
First, the Court considered the argument that the Proposed Act would
impose a dominant social ethos that would limit the freedom to hold
religious beliefs to the contrary. To this the Court responded with a
single proposition: “the mere recognition of the equality rights of one
group cannot, in itself, constitute a violation of the rights of another.”75
This was not a satisfying response. Rights can conflict. More to the
point here is that the Proposed Act does not interfere with the freedom
to hold contrary beliefs. Freedom of religion does not entail a right to
have legal norms aligned with one’s religious beliefs. The argument
misconstrues religious freedom with religious imposition.
Second, the Court rejected the argument that the passage of the
Proposed Act would violate the Charter because it would lead to a collision between the rights of same-sex couples and the religious freedom
of those opposed to same-sex marriage. The Court responded by acknowledging the possibility of such collisions occurring in the future,
and by saying, in essence, that the Court would balance competing
rights, as it has in other cases.76
Finally, the Court stated that section 2(a) would protect religious officials in the unlikely event that the state at some future date might seek
to compel them to perform same-sex marriages contrary to their religious beliefs. Freedom of religion protects religious practice, and “[t]he
performance of religious rites is a fundamental aspect of religious practice.”77 State interference with religious rites would constitute a severe
violation of religious freedom. But the Court went beyond this obvious
conclusion. It also stated that section 2(a) would protect religious officials
from being compelled by the state to perform civil same-sex marriages
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that are contrary to their religious beliefs.78 The Court offered no reasoning in support of this more controversial conclusion.
A civil marriage is not a religious rite. If a religious official is licensed to perform civil marriages, he or she is delivering a public service in a secular context on behalf of the state. He or she is acting as a
public official, not a religious official, and thus is bound to comply with
Charter equality rights. Same-sex couples have no right of access to a
marriage ceremony in a religious context, but they do have a right of
equal access to all public services, including civil marriage. The appropriate balance between a public official’s religious or conscientious
objection to performing civil same-sex marriages and a same-sex couple’s equal right to a civil marriage ought not to tilt automatically in one
direction or the other.
In the wake of court rulings legalizing civil same-sex marriage,
some provincial governments have reportedly directed their marriage
commissioners to be prepared to perform civil same-sex marriages or
resign. If governments do not provide an exemption from performing
same-sex marriages to religious objectors, such a directive would constitute religious discrimination in employment contrary to the Charter and
applicable provincial human rights legislation. Human rights jurisprudence supports the rights of employees, whether in the public or the
private sector, whether or not they are religious officials, to object to the
performance of job duties on religious grounds, and employers have an
obligation to accommodate them if they can do so without undue hardship. Thus, for example, a tribunal has held that a public sector employee who objected to abortion on religious grounds could not be
compelled to process a claim for abortion-related benefits, since the
government failed to demonstrate efforts to accommodate her beliefs up
to the point of undue hardship.79
Thus, whether a public official is entitled to a religious or conscientious objection from being compelled to perform civil same-sex marriages depends on whether the official’s beliefs could be accommodated
without undue hardship — in particular, without compromising a same-sex
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couple’s equal access to civil marriage. Most of the time, governments
should have little difficulty respecting both religious freedom and equal
access to civil marriage, since other public officials will be available and
willing to marry same-sex couples. If this is not the case, however, it
may be a reasonable limit on a public official’s religious freedom to
require him or her to perform a civil same-sex marriage ceremony. In
the absence of a factual context, it is not possible to resolve the collision
of rights that may arise when a public official licensed to perform marriages refuses to perform same-sex marriages on religious grounds.
(c) Defining Conscientious and Religious Belief: Amselem
Since the state has a duty to adjust laws or policies to eliminate
state-imposed burdens on the exercise of religious freedoms, including
practices grounded in religious beliefs, a series of questions with crucial
legal significance arise about the nature of religious belief. How do we
go about determining what practices qualify as grounded in religious
beliefs? What is a religion? Who determines the scope of religious belief? These questions have bedevilled religious studies and legal theory
for some time. Many scholars acknowledge that it is impossible to precisely define religion.80
As if the question of defining religion was not hard enough, section
2(a) of the Charter protects “freedom of conscience and religion.” Discussions of section 2(a) commonly omit reference to freedom of conscience, using “freedom of religion” as a shorthand way of describing
what are in fact two closely related yet distinct fundamental freedoms.
This tendency should not lead us to lose sight of the importance of freedom of conscience, or erase it from section 2(a), or collapse it into freedom of religion. The reference to conscience must add something to
section 2(a); it must lead to constitutional protection of some nonreligious belief systems.
An example of the recognition of the independent significance of
freedom of conscience in protecting practices grounded in non-religious
belief systems is the case of Maurice v. Canada (Attorney General).81
80
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The claimant, a federal inmate, had received a vegetarian diet on religious grounds until he renounced his Hare Krishna faith. Thereafter,
Correctional Services Canada (“CSC”) refused to provide him with a
vegetarian diet even though he insisted on it as a matter of moral conscience. Justice Campbell found that his freedom of conscience had
been violated:
… while the CSC has recognized its legal duty to facilitate the
religious freedoms outlined in the Charter, freedom of conscience has
been effectively ignored. Section 2(a) of the Charter affords the
fundamental freedom of both religion and conscience, yet by the
CSC’s policy, inmates with conscientiously held beliefs may be denied
expression of their “conscience.” In my opinion the CSC’s approach is
inconsistent. The CSC cannot incorporate s. 2(a) of the Charter in a
82
piecemeal manner; both freedoms are to be recognized.

In other words, even if a practice is grounded in a belief that does
not qualify as religious, it may still be protected by section 2(a) if the
belief is a conscientious one. Justice Campbell in Maurice was satisfied
that vegetarianism, as a dietary choice founded on the belief that the
consumption of animals is morally wrong, is a belief system that qualified as conscientious in that case.83
When do beliefs become matters of conscience for constitutional
purposes? Not all beliefs or opinions can qualify as matters of conscience; otherwise, freedom of conscience would become the freedom to
disregard all laws with which we disagree. As a Scottish court stated
when a fox-hunter challenged a law prohibiting hunting animals with
dogs, freedom of conscience cannot “give individuals a right to perform
any acts in pursuance of whatever beliefs they may hold.”84 Yet the
spectre of anarchy should not be invoked to deny protection entirely to
practices grounded in non-religious conscience. Freedom of conscience,
for the purposes of section 2(a), ought to embrace comprehensive nonreligious belief systems that have the kinds of significance in the lives of
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believers analogous to the significance of religion in the lives of the
devout.85
Clearly, courts interpreting section 2(a) face significant challenges
in defining the scope and nature of religious and non-religious conscientious belief systems. Until last year, the Supreme Court had managed to
avoid the issue in its Charter rulings. In Syndicat Northcrest v.
Amselem,86 members of the Court engaged in a fascinating debate about
the nature of religious belief. The issue was whether the religious freedom of the appellants, Orthodox Jewish residents of a co-operatively
owned building, gave them a legal right to build succahs, or temporary
shelters, on their balconies during the Jewish holiday of Succot. Construction on the balconies was prohibited by the terms of co-ownership.
The evidence presented by two rabbis at trial did not establish that Jewish religious doctrine required each resident to build a personal succah.
The trial judge, and a majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal, concluded that the claimants’ freedom of religion had not been violated because
they had failed to establish that the practice at issue was required by
official religious teachings.
On appeal, Iacobucci J., writing for a 5-4 majority,87 held that the
appellants’ religious freedom did entitle them to build succahs on their
balconies, that they had not waived their rights, and that no sufficiently
compelling competing interests existed that could justify limiting their
rights. Because the dispute involved private parties, it fell to be resolved according to the requirements imposed by the guarantee of freedom of religion in the Quebec human rights legislation, the Quebec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.88 The Canadian Charter did
not apply. Nevertheless, Iacobucci J. stated that his analysis of the scope

85
The reference to conscience in s. 2(a) encourages Canadian courts to adopt a definition
of the term as broad as the interpretation given to the term “religion” by the U.S. Supreme Court in
the conscientious objector cases of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (interpreting a
statutory exemption from military service based on religious belief as including a purely ethical
creed “which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption”) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (religious exemption can be claimed by persons with deeply held moral or ethical beliefs who would
have “no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.”).
86
Supra, note 4.
87
McLachlin C.J.C., Major, Arbour and Fish JJ. concurring.
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of religious freedom was equally applicable to the Quebec and Canadian
Charters.89
Justice Bastarache dissented,90 holding that religious freedom was
not violated since it was not a requirement of the Jewish faith that the
appellants build their own succahs. Even if the appellants were required
by a precept of their religious faith to build succahs, Bastarache J. would
have found the infringement of their religious freedom to be justified by
the competing rights of other co-owners. Justice Binnie wrote a separate
dissent finding that the appellants’ freedom of religion was reasonably
limited on the specific facts of the case.
The majority and dissenting judgments are remarkably different in
their spirit and in their approach to defining the scope of religious freedom. The majority took an expansive view, emphasizing the public
value of respect for and tolerance of the rights and practices of religious
minorities. The dissenting judges took a much narrower view, portraying the appellants as inflexibly insisting on questionable religious practices to the detriment of the security and comfort of their co-residents.
Justice Iacobucci began his discussion of religious freedom by offering the Court’s first attempt to define the concept of religion:
Defined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and
comprehensive system of faith and worship. Religion also tends to
involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power. In
essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions
or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally
linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of
which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with
91
the subject or object of that spiritual faith.

In his view, a claimant need not show that an asserted religious belief is “objectively recognized as valid by other members of the religion.”92 While a claimant may more easily establish the religious nature
of a belief or practice if there is evidence that it corresponds with official
religious dogma, such evidence is not necessary.93 Nor should freedom of
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religion be confined to religious obligations; the Charter also protects
“voluntary expressions of faith.”94 In sum, in the majority’s view,
… freedom of religion consists of the freedom to undertake practices
and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with religion, in which an
individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is sincerely
undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his
or her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or
belief is required by official religious dogma or is in conformity with
95
the position of religious officials.

Inquiries into the sincerity of an individual’s asserted religious beliefs should be as limited as possible:
… the court’s role in assessing sincerity is intended only to ensure that
a presently asserted religious belief is in good faith, neither fictitious
nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice. Otherwise, nothing short of
a religious inquisition would be required to decipher the innermost
96
beliefs of human beings.

Justice Iacobucci offered two reasons in support of this broad conception of religious freedom. First, it was consistent with the emphasis
on “personal choice of religious beliefs” in the jurisprudence.97 Second,
the courts should not restrict religious beliefs to officially supported
dogma because they would then be dragged into adjudicating religious
doctrine, a domain forbidden by the requirements of state neutrality:
… the State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of
religious dogma. Accordingly, courts should avoid judicially
interpreting and thus determining, either explicitly or implicitly, the
content of a subjective understanding of religious requirement,
“obligation,” precept, “commandment,” custom or ritual. Secular
judicial determinations of theological or religious disputes, or of
contentious matters of religious doctrine, unjustifiably entangle the
98
court in the affairs of religion.
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While it is certainly an advantage of this approach that it limits the
need to entangle the courts in disputes about religious doctrine, it is
doubtful that the problem can be entirely avoided. Without any demonstrated religious connection apart from the claimant’s asserted sincere
belief, is it possible to determine when personal opinions become “religious”? Do religious beliefs and practices not inevitably involve some
connection with a religious history and community?99 Even Iacobucci
J.’s definition requires “a nexus with religion,” an element he asserted
but did not discuss in this case, presumably because, as Binnie J. noted,
the appellants’ claim so clearly related to their understanding of Jewish
requirements during Succot.100 In less clear cases, establishing “a nexus
with religion” may inevitably involve the courts in at least some general
assessment of the presence or absence of objectively verifiable religious
doctrine.
In Bastarache J.’s dissenting opinion, the majority’s approach did
not adequately distinguish between “genuine religious beliefs and personal choices or practices that are unrelated to freedom of conscience.”101 To take adequate account of the fact that religious freedom
has “genuine social significance and involves a relationship with others,”102 religious beliefs must be connected to religious precepts, a body
of objectively identifiable data.
While one can readily agree with Bastarache J. on the importance of
recognizing the collective aspects of religious observance, it is not clear
why this requires the exclusion of matters of purely individual conscience.103 Justice Bastarache’s opinion uses the language of religion
and conscience interchangeably. This, coupled with his insistence on
maintaining a clear boundary between the religious and the secular,
leads one to wonder whether he would accord any independent significance to section 2(a)’s protection of freedom of conscience.
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This point was emphasized by Bastarache J. in dissent (id., at para. 137), citing Timothy
Macklem, “Faith as a Secular Value” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 1 at 25.
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Id., at para. 189.
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The second way in which Bastarache J.’s view differed from the
majority is that he held that a claimant must demonstrate a sincere belief
that the practice dependent on the religious precept is mandatory. In his
view, religious practices that are voluntary in nature are not protected.104
His insistence on limiting protection to objectively verifiable religious precepts sincerely thought to be mandatory led Bastarache J. to a
different conclusion than the majority. Justice Iacobucci found that the
appellants’ freedom of religion had been violated because they held
sincere beliefs that constructing and dwelling in their own succahs had
religious significance to them. Justice Bastarache, on the other hand,
was not persuaded that the appellants sincerely believed, based on an
objectively established precept of their religion, that they were under an
obligation to erect their own succahs.105 In his dissenting view, their
sincere religious preference was not a mandatory religious practice and
therefore their religious freedom had not been violated.

III.

CONCLUSION

The three 2004 Supreme Court rulings canvassed above made significant contributions to our understanding of the nature of religious
freedom and the state’s duty of religious neutrality.
While the majority in Lafontaine avoided the religious freedom issue, LeBel J.’s dissent introduced the language of religious neutrality
into the Court’s jurisprudence and his thoughtful discussion of its implications ought to contribute to future debates. Moreover, his opinion
affirmed the existence of positive state duties to accommodate religious
worship. On the other hand, some of his comments relied on a questionable understanding of religious neutrality that might deter governments
from undertaking steps to facilitate the exercise of religious freedoms in
the future. The notion that governments are entitled, indeed should be
encouraged, to engage in even-handed support of religion, is not yet
strongly rooted in the jurisprudence.
The Court’s opinion in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference was
commendable for so clearly stating that religious freedom is in no way
threatened by the federal government’s Proposed Act (subsequently
introduced in Parliament in slightly altered form as Bill C-38). The
104
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move from a definition of civil marriage rooted in Christendom to one
aimed at fulfilling the secular ideals of the Charter is consistent with the
state’s duty of religious neutrality, and the Court’s opinion played a
valuable role in removing any legal objections to its attainment.
Justice Iacobucci’s opinion for the majority in Amselem is the
Court’s most ambitious contribution to the jurisprudence on freedom of
religion since the Big M ruling. The majority broadly defined freedom
of religion as embracing sincerely held subjective beliefs having a nexus
with religion, regardless of whether those beliefs are supported by objective evidence of corresponding religious dogma. His emphasis on
personal choice may pave the way for the development of an equally
broad conception of freedom of conscience in the future. His opinion
contains a strong endorsement of the idea that the courts should avoid as
much as possible becoming arbiters of religious doctrine, another positive development from the point of view of state religious neutrality.
Justice Iacobucci’s ruling in Amselem may become a leading case
on Canadian constitutional understandings of religious freedom. However, the Court in Amselem was sharply divided. Justice Iacobucci’s
broad conception of when beliefs and practices qualify as religious was
strongly resisted in Bastarache J.’s dissent. In his separate dissent,
Binnie J. noted that the majority’s ruling results in a “right of immense
potential scope” that, in his view, too easily prevailed over other competing rights and interests in the private context in which it arose.106 A
future majority of the Court may question Iacobucci J.’s contention that
his broad definition of religious freedom should be equally applicable to
the constitutional guarantee in the Charter, where it is subject only to
reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified by governments
pursuant to section 1.
The Court was divided 5-4 in Amselem and Lafontaine, and the
judges may have achieved unanimity in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference by deferring a number of difficult issues for future elucidation. No
doubt in the years ahead we will continue to witness divisions on the
appropriate scope of religious freedoms and state duties of religious
neutrality. With two members of the Amselem majority (Arbour and
Iacobucci JJ.) no longer on the Court, the Court may not adopt as generous an approach to religious freedom in forthcoming rulings as it did in
2004.
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